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1. Introduction
A signiﬁcant amount of theorizing in Cognitive-Philosophical pragmatics,
or so-called Anglo-American pragmatics, has been premised on the
view that communication involves speakers expressing their intentions,
and hearers attributing intentions to those speakers. If the intentions
attributed by the hearers are roughly the same as those expressed by the
speaker, then communication is considered to have been successful. One
of the tasks of pragmatics, according to this view, then, is to explicate
how exactly the hearer makes these inferences, as well as how speakers
and hearers know the ‘‘correct’’ inferences have been made, and so deter-
mine what counts as (the speaker’s) meaning. Levinson (2006a, 2006b),
for instance, has recently reasserted the centrality of (Gricean) intentions
in postulating an ‘‘interaction engine’’ that he argues underpins human
interaction.
The capacity for Gricean intentions (as in Grice’s 1957 theory of meaning), that is
intentions driving behaviours whose sole function is to have the motivating inten-
tions recognized . . . is what makes open-ended communication possible, commu-
nication beyond a small ﬁxed repertoire of signals. (Levinson 2006a: 87)
The heart of the matter is intention attribution: given the observed behaviour, the
interaction engine must be able to infer likely goals that would have motivated the
behaviour. (Levinson 2006b: 48)
In Levinson’s view, then, human communication is crucially dependent
on the existence of communicative intentions, speciﬁcally Gricean inten-
tions, which exist in the minds of speakers, and about which addressees
make inferences. This presumption of the centrality of intention in com-
munication is common to theorists who hold to view that pragmatics is—
or should be—about the study of meaning beyond what is said as a ‘‘core
component of a theory of language, on a par with phonetics, phonology,
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morphology, syntax and semantics’’ (Huang 2007: 4), including adherents
of Gricean and neo-Gricean Pragmatics, Relevance Theory, and Speech
Act Theory among others. The importance of intention to the Cognitive-
Philosophical perspective in pragmatics can be traced to Grice’s seminal
work on (speaker) meaning. In a break from previous approaches, Grice
argued that a speaker meantNN something by x if and only if S ‘‘intended
the utterance of x to produce some e¤ect in an audience by means of
the recognition of this intention’’ (Grice 1957: 385). Grice’s approach to
(speaker) meaning was then aligned with more general theories of com-
munication by those developing the ﬁeld of (linguistic) pragmatics.1 In
the Cognitive-Philosophical perspective on pragmatics, then, there has
seemingly been little question amongst theorists that (Gricean) intentions
in some form or another lie at the heart of communication.
On the other hand, in much of the theorizing of pragmatics in Socio-
cultural-Interactional pragmatics, or so-called European-Continental
pragmatics, discussion of the place of intention in communication is
notable for its equivocality. Intention is often labeled as ‘‘problematic’’
and then only mentioned again in passing, if at all, in the analytical frame-
works that are subsequently developed. Verschueren (1999: 48), for ex-
ample, argues in his call for ‘‘a pragmatic return to meaning in its full
complexity, allowing for interacting forces of language production and
interpretation’’ that while intentions may play a role in the broader sense
of ‘‘directedness’’, communication is not always dependent on speaker
intentions.
It would be unwarranted to downplay the role which intentions also play. An im-
portant philosophical correlate of intentionality is ‘directedness’. Being directed at
certain goals is no doubt an aspect of what goes on in language use . . . But it
would be equally unwise to claim that every type of communicated meaning is de-
pendent on a deﬁnable individual intention on the part of the utterer. Such a
claim would be patently false. (Verschueren 1999: 48)
In Verschueren’s view, then, while intentions do play a role in communi-
cation, he does not regard them as always being central to interaction.2
This equivocal treatment of intention in communication is common to
theorists who hold the view that pragmatics is—or should be—about
‘‘the study of language in human communication as determined by the
conditions of society’’ (Mey 2001: 6), or alternatively ‘‘a general cogni-
tive, and cultural perspective on linguistic phenomena in relation to their
usage in forms of behaviour’’ (Verschueren 1999: 7). The equivocality, or
even rejection, of a role for intention in analyzing interaction has thus ar-
guably been a central tenet in the Sociocultural-Interactional perspective
on pragmatics.
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In light of the entrenched nature of views on intention in both the
Cognitive-Philosophical and Sociocultural-Interactional traditions in
pragmatics, it is perhaps not surprising that the question of the place of
intention in pragmatics has been attended to only sporadically by re-
searchers. Yet, while debates about intention in pragmatics have been
somewhat limited—as opposed to ongoing work in psychology and cog-
nitive science3—a number of the issues that have been raised in these de-
bates bring into serious question some of the fundamental assumptions
held about the place of intention in pragmatics.
In the case of the Cognitive-Philosophical perspective on pragmatics,
the role that Gricean intentions, or reﬁnements thereof, actually play in
understanding (speaker) meaning, and more broadly communication,
has been hotly debated (Bach 1987; Davis 1998, 2007, 2008; Gibbs 1999,
2001; Green 2007, 2008; Jaszczolt 2005, 2006; Keysar 2007; Recanati
1986; Saul 2001; Searle 1983, 1990; Thompson 2008). These debates have
involved, for instance, challenges to Grice’s emphasis on the reﬂexivity of
(communicative) intentions, the drawing of attention to the relative neglect
of conventionality in the Gricean account of meaning, and proposals that
shared or ‘‘we-intentions’’, rather than individual intentions, underlie com-
munication. All of these debates indicate that Gricean intentions may
play a less central role in communication than traditionally assumed.
In the case of Sociocultural-Interactional pragmatics, while intention
has for the most part received little attention, the role intention might
nevertheless play in approaches which eschew, or at least remain some-
what agnostic about, ‘‘cognitivism’’ has also been more carefully consid-
ered in recent years by conversation analysts and discursive psychologists
(Bilmes 1986; Drew 1995, 2005; Edwards 2006; Edwards & Potter 2005;
Heritage [1990] 1991; Hopper 2005; Scheglo¤ 1996). Much of this work
has centered on the claim that intention is more usefully understood as a
post facto construct that is explicitly topicalized in accounting for actions,
including violations of norms or other interactional troubles, or implicitly
invoked in other subtle ways through interaction. It has also been argued
that intention attribution should actually be regarded as a culture-speciﬁc
perspective on communication by a number of theorists working in
the anthropological tradition (Danziger 2006; Duranti 1988, 1993, 2006;
LeVine 1984; Ochs 1984; Richland 2006; Rosaldo 1982). The key claim
made by linguistic anthropologists is that the conceptualization of inten-
tion as an a priori mental state that underpins communication is not nec-
essarily analytically productive, particularly as it is contextualized in dif-
ferent ways across cultures. These arguments indicate that a more radical
reconceptualization of the place of (Gricean) intentions in pragmatics
may be necessary.
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While these various debates considered in isolation might resemble
‘‘squabbles at the margins’’ to some (cf. Levinson 2006a: 90), when these
arguments are brought together it becomes apparent that the role inten-
tion plays is more complex than proponents from both of these broad
perspectives in pragmatics might at ﬁrst glance assume. The aim of this
special issue is thus to bring these debates into a single forum, and there-
by suggest that while the evidence mounting against the continued place-
ment of Gricean intentions at the centre of theorizing in pragmatics is
now substantial, if not overwhelming, there remains a need to account
for the cognition that underlies interaction. In this way, it is hoped that
more substantive dialogue between scholars working in di¤erent tradi-
tions about this arguably core issue in pragmatics might be stimulated.
2. Intention in the mind
While Grice’s formulation of the intentions underlying speaker meaning
has been debated and undergone various ‘‘reﬁnements’’ in accounting
for communication, these modiﬁcations have for the most part not devi-
ated from the central claim that reﬂexive intentions to communicate are
attributed to speakers by addressees in interaction. However, in the ﬁrst
three papers in this special issue, this assumption is challenged in the con-
text of two of the most important post-Gricean theories of meaning, and
communication, respectively, to have emerged, the Expression Theory
of Meaning (Davis 2003) and Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson
1995). These papers point towards drawing the conclusion that Gricean
intentions are not what solely underpin (speaker) meaning, let alone com-
municative interactions, contrary to Levinson’s (2006a, 2006b) recent
claims.
Grice’s presumption that the intentions underlying meaning need be
reﬂexive is ﬁrst challenged by Wayne Davis in his paper, ‘‘Expressing,
meaning, showing and intending to indicate,’’ which opens this special is-
sue. Davis contrasts his approach to speaker meaning and communica-
tion with Green’s (2007) theory of Self-Expression, the latter of which
draws from Grice’s original work in characterizing speaker meaning as
being dependent on reﬂexive intentions. According to Green, speaker
meaning is (roughly) dependent on making manifest the speaker’s belief
that p, as well as the speaker’s intention to make this belief manifest.
Davis, however, counters that Green’s theory of self-expression is too
weak in some respects, while too strong in other respects. In particular,
he argues that only ﬁrst-order intentions, rather than second-order reﬂex-
ive intentions, are involved in self-expression and speaker meaning. Davis
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also argues that while speaker meaning and expression involve intending
to indicate, they do not involve showing.
In Tim Wharton’s paper—‘‘ ‘MeaningNN’ and ‘showing’: Gricean in-
tentions and relevance-theoretic intentions’’—important di¤erences be-
tween Gricean and Relevance theoretic approaches to intention are dis-
cussed. Gricean intentions are deconstructed by Relevance theorists into
the informative intention, that is, the intention ‘‘to make manifest or
more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions’’ (Sperber & Wilson
1995: 58), and the communicative intention, namely the intention ‘‘to
make it mutually manifest to audience and communicator that the com-
municator has this informative intention (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 61).
Thus, while Relevance Theory is often framed as building upon Grice’s
intention-centered view of meaning, in framing the informative intention
as an intention to modify the cognitive environment of the addressee
rather than his or her thoughts per se, and by distinguishing it from the
communicative intention, Relevance Theory thereby arguably allows for
a more nuanced view of intention. Wharton focuses on clarifying the im-
plications of this move in terms of the Relevance Theoretic continuum
between strong and weak communication. In particular, he argues there
are varying degrees to which hearers are required to consider the inten-
tions of speakers underlying behavior along the continuum between
showing and meaningNN. He concludes that the range of ‘‘meanings’’
that can arise from an utterance are much more complex than the inten-
tions normally attributed to speakers in explicating their observed behav-
ior, and so must also involve recourse to ‘‘fast and frugal heuristics.’’
The distinction between the informative and communicative intentions
is further developed in Eniko˝ Ne´meth T’s paper, ‘‘Verbal information
transmission without communicative intention.’’ Ne´meth T. proposes
that there is an important non-communicative form of language use that
has been relatively neglected in pragmatics, namely ‘‘informative lan-
guage use.’’ Important di¤erences, as well as similarities, between com-
municative language use and informative language use are also high-
lighted. For example, informative language use is characterized as less
dynamic than communicative language use, in that there is little room
for speakers to make self-corrections or elaborations or for the addressee
to provide feedback on what he or she has understood to have been com-
municated. Ne´meth T. also argues that not all language use involves
the speaker intending to inform the addressee of his or her intention
to inform (the communicative intention) contrary to the received view
in Relevance Theory. The notion of ‘‘manipulative intentions’’ is pro-
posed to account for such cases where the speaker ‘‘hides’’ his or her in-
tention. Ne´meth T. thus goes beyond the traditional Relevance theoretic
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distinction between covert and overt communication, which is character-
ized in terms of the presence or not of a communicative intention on the
part of the speaker, in claiming that manipulative intentions may underlie
both informative and communicative language use.
The ﬁrst three papers in this special issue indicate that there is consid-
erable debate in regards to the characterization of intention in prag-
matics. While Davis argues second-order (that is, reﬂexive) intentions, of
which Relevance Theoretic communicative intentions are an example, are
unnecessary in accounting for speaker meaning, Wharton and Ne´meth T.
defend the Relevance Theoretic distinction between informative and com-
municative intentions, and so implicitly hold to the position that the in-
tentions underlying communication may at times be reﬂexive. However,
they also both move away from the received view in Relevance Theory
that there are just two types of intention underlying communication, or
more broadly language use, thereby allowing for a more nuanced view
of intention and its possible place in pragmatics. Thus, while Cognitive-
Philosophical pragmatics clearly owes a considerable debt to Grice’s
seminal work on the role of intentions in characterizing speaker meaning,
a central place for Gricean intentions in Cognitive-Philosophical ap-
proaches to meaning and communication is by no means assured.
3. Intention in interaction
While Cognitive-Philosophical approaches to pragmatics tend to view
intention as an a priori mental state of speakers, in Sociocultural-
Interactional pragmatics intention has for the most part been conceptual-
ized as a post facto participant resource that emerges through interaction.
The next two papers in this issue explore how intention, in the sense of a
discursive resource of participants, is interactionally achieved.
Derek Edwards explores the ways in which intention and intentionality
are invoked as a discursive description of events in ‘‘Intentionality and
mens rea in police interrogations: the production of actions as crimes.’’
He focuses on how intention(ality) is speciﬁcally topicalized in the
culturally-embedded context of establishing mens rea—the mental state
that needs to be attributed to the person charged for it to constitute a
crime in the British justice system—in police interrogations. Edwards
shows how police carefully attempt to construct through interrogations
the degree of culpability of the accused for damage caused to property,
ranging from deliberate damage, recklessness, negligence, through to ac-
cidental damage. This degree of culpability assumes an underlying scale
of ‘‘intentionality’’, and so the analysis focuses on the various strategies
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police interrogators use to attribute varying degrees of intention(ality),
and the ways in which the accused resist such attributions.
The notion that intentions may be analyzed as a participant resource in
disputing meanings is developed further by Michael Haugh in his paper,
‘‘Intention and diverging interpretings of implicature in the ‘uncovered
meat’ sermon.’’ Haugh argues that the view that miscommunication in-
volves the addressee incorrectly inferring the speaker’s intention gives an
impoverished account of the controversy that arose over what was im-
plied by the ‘‘uncovered meat’’ comments made by Hilali during a recent
sermon given in a Sydney mosque. While Hilali and his associates made
various attempts to ground their interpretation of what was implied by
the comments in Hilali’s intended meaning and how the comments would
have been understood by his intended audience, these accounts were re-
jected by media commentators. In tracing this discursive dispute over
what was implied, it is argued by Haugh that it could not have been
Hilali’s intentions per se about which the broader Australian public were
making inferences. Instead, it was through di¤erences in underlying soci-
ocultural presuppositions and interpretive norms that these diverging
understandings of what was implied arose. In this way, intention as a
post facto participant resource can be exploited in developing a richer ex-
plication of ‘‘deep misunderstanding’’ in intercultural contexts.
In the ﬁnal paper, which concludes this special issue, ‘‘Against (Gri-
cean) intentions at the heart of human interaction,’’ Robert Arundale
considers the implications of re-conceptualizing communication as inter-
actional for Levinson’s (2006a, 2006b) recent claim that Gricean inten-
tions are central to interaction.4 He carefully marshals evidence to show
how Gricean intentions are inconsistent with the dynamic emergence of
meaning in interaction. In characterizing interaction as the sequential
achievement of coordinated meanings by speakers and hearers, Arundale
argues that the Gricean mechanism is not a plausible explanation, con-
trary to Levinson’s (2006a, b) recent claims. In particular, he shows how
Gricean intentions cannot account for the ways in which meanings and
actions are proactively and retroactively inﬂuenced due to the sequential
interdependence of utterances in interaction. This means that Gricean in-
tentions, and perhaps intentions in general, should have no privileged
place in explaining language use. Arundale goes on to propose that what
lies at the heart of interaction is the reﬂexive attribution of meanings, and
the holding accountable of speakers for those meanings. These reﬂexively
attributed meanings range from the words distinguished and turn con-
structional units recognized, through to the actions understood and
the implicatures constructed, as well as the emotions and the relation-
ships developed, among other things. Because recipients hold speakers
Intention in pragmatics 105
 - 10.1515/IP.2008.006
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/15/2016 01:23:50AM
via University of Queensland - UQ Library
accountable for these meanings, Arundale argues that intention does have
a place in analysis, namely as a discursive description of events seen to
have ‘‘directionality’’ or ‘‘aboutness.’’ In doing so, Arundale o¤ers a de-
tailed and sophisticated explication of how communication can be recon-
ceptualized without the need for recourse to (Gricean) intentions.
However, whether one ultimately accepts this move to displace inten-
tion in pragmatics, it becomes apparent from these ﬁnal three papers that
intention plays a role in interaction which has not been considered in
depth within Cognitive-Philosophical pragmatics thus far. The neglect of
the ways in which intention is invoked in discursive dispute of events may
seem at ﬁrst glance to be of peripheral interest in pragmatics, but the
stakes can be very high indeed as demonstrated through both Haugh’s
analysis of the controversy that ensued over the ‘‘uncovered meat’’ com-
ments, and Edwards’ analysis of the imputation of mens rea, which is cru-
cial to establishing the degree of severity of charges in criminal cases. As
Arundale argues, it may be that the place of intention in pragmatics is
properly reserved for the analysis of such cases. However, such a move
has the potential to widen the gap between Sociocultural-Interactional
and Cognitive-Philosophical approaches to pragmatics. The question
arises, then, as to whether these perspectives should, or even can, be
reconciled.
4. Reconciling cognitive and interactional perspectives on intention?
The question of whether there is any value in attempting to reconcile
Cognitive-Philosophical and Sociocultural-Interactional perspectives on
intention lies at the heart of the potential of this special issue to make a
contribution to the discipline of pragmatics. In considering the reactions
such questions can sometimes elicit, it is perhaps worth recalling a recent
‘‘discussion’’ of the place of intention in pragmatics that ensued during
the question time following a plenary at one of the more recent Interna-
tional Pragmatics Association conferences. After the plenary was ﬁnished
one member of the audience challenged the speaker on whether intention
really had such a central role to play in communication. The response
from the plenary speaker, however, which was something to the tune of
‘‘Well if we’re not talking about intention, I don’t know what we’re talk-
ing about,’’ shut down any discussion before it had even begun. The ques-
tion of the place of intention can thus generate incompatible responses
from those working in pragmatics and related disciplines, ranging from
‘‘believers’’ through to ‘‘skeptics’’ (with perhaps not a few ‘‘agnostics’’
in-between). And just as discussing di¤erent religious beliefs invariably
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ends in conﬂict and so is invariably avoided, so too apparently is discus-
sion of the place of intention in pragmatics often regarded as unproduc-
tive, and the adage ‘‘to let sleeping dogs lie’’ seems apt. The question per-
haps arises, then, as to why this special issue on intention in pragmatics?
It is suggested here, in response to such a possible line of argument that
disciplines do not advance by avoiding the slippery questions that lay at
their very foundations. It is in dealing with seemingly intractable issues
that we can see with greater clarity through to the epistemological, onto-
logical, and methodological assumptions underlying di¤erent research
traditions in pragmatics. Levinson (2005) has recently suggested that
there are three basic levels of analysis in studies of human interaction,
what he terms the individual (or linguistic), interactional, and sociocul-
tural systems. The papers in this special issue approach intention at each
of these so-called di¤erent ‘‘levels’’, and more importantly touch upon
possible links between these levels.
The ﬁrst three papers in this issue, for instance, assume an epistemol-
ogy grounded in (the minds of ) the individual, and (arguably) a positivist
ontology in analyzing the place of intention in pragmatics. However,
while the contribution by Davis frames intention purely in terms of the
individual, for instance, Wharton and Ne´meth T.’s papers also move to
some extent towards a conceptualization incorporating insights from an
epistemology of intentions grounded in interaction (at least in the weaker
sense of interaction as involving more than one person conversing). The
second three papers in this issue, on the other hand, assume an epistemol-
ogy that is grounded in interaction (in the stronger, more technical
sense—see footnote 4), and a social constructionist ontology in their anal-
yses of what place intention might productively have in pragmatics. Yet
while Edwards approaches intention as a largely interactional phenome-
non, Haugh also explores the possible inﬂuences of broader sociocul-
tural ‘‘norms’’ in the ways in which intention is invoked in interaction.
Arundale’s paper touches on all three ‘‘levels,’’ and thus provides a useful
overview of the epistemological and ontological commitments of Gricean
versus social constructionist views of communication and the implications
of these for the place of intention in pragmatics.
In teasing out these underlying assumptions, then, we may respond to
Scheglo¤ ’s (2005: 476–477) call for researchers to carefully ground their
analyses in some kind of empirical reality. As while the continued exis-
tence of multiple perspectives on the place of intention in pragmatics
is no doubt a means of advancing the discipline, it is ultimately only
through discarding certain views and developing new alternatives that
we may ultimately deepen our understanding of meaning, communication
and interaction.
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Notes
1. Ironically, such a move was not necessarily intended by Grice himself (Arundale 1991;
cf. Neale 1992).
2. It is worthwhile noting here, however, that Verschueren makes no sharp distinction be-
tween intention in the intuitive folk sense (as an a priori plan or motivation underlying
an action), and intentionality in the more broad philosophical sense inherited from
Brentano of ‘‘aboutness’’ or ‘‘directedness’’ (Nuyts 2000), and so is presumably arguing
for the importance of intentionality rather than intention per se in communication.
3. See for instance: Cohen, Morgan and Pollack (1990); Malle, Moses and Baldwin (2001);
Malle and Hodges (2005); and Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne and Moll (2005).
4. It is important to note that interactional here does not simply refer to two or more peo-
ple ‘‘talking,’’ but rather is used in the technical sense of ‘‘index[ing] the conjoint, non-
summative outcome of two or more factors’’ (Arundale 2006: 196).
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